Explaining Phenomenal Consciousness. Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?  by Dumitru, Mircea
 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  78 ( 2013 )  635 – 641 
1877-0428 © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of PSIWORLD 2012
doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.04.366 
PSIWORLD 2012 
Explaining phenomenal consciousness. Does conceivability entail 
possibility? 
Mircea Dumitru* 
University of Bucharest, Faculty of Philosophy, 504 Bd. Splaiul Independentei, Bucharest, Romania 
Abstract 
Explaining phenomenal consciousness may very well be the scientific and philosophical problem of our age. There is a 
conceptual tension which makes the task of giving a unitary explanation to the mind and to the physical world one of the most 
persistent and intriguing enigma. The predominant outlook about the natural world is of a physical kind. However, the mind 
and especially the conscious subjective experience do not seem to fit within this naturalist and physicalist explanation. It 
appears that we are caught in a dilemma, for we either stick to a physicalist explanation, or else we should figure out a 
dramatic change of our conception about the natural world. 
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1. Theoretical debate 
Explaining phenomenal consciousness may very well be the scientific and philosophical problem of our age, 
the last frontier of knowledge. However, this is an extremely difficult task; for any attempt to find a proper place 
for consciousness within the natural world turned out so far to be not at all trivial. There is a conceptual tension 
which makes the task of giving a unitary explanation to the mind and to the physical world one of the most 
persistent and intriguing enigma. The predominant outlook about the natural world is of a physical kind. 
However, the mind and especially the conscious subjective experience do not seem to fit within this naturalist and 
physicalist explanation. It appears that we are caught in a dilemma, for we either stick to a physicalist 
explanation, but then it seems that we have to leave out consciousness, or else we should figure out a dramatic 
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change of our conception about the natural world, which of course is extremely improbable. But then, is any 
attempt at understanding consciousness a dead-end, something which is doomed to fail? 
Even raising the issue in a neutral way which does not beg the question for or against the main contenders in 
the  metaphysics  of  mind  is  not  easy.  To  begin  with,  one  may  question  the  soundness  of  drawing  the  alleged  
distinction between the easy problems of consciousness, such as the ability to discriminate and integrate stimuli, 
to report information, to monitor internal states, or to control behavior, and the hard problem of consciousness, 
viz. the problem of why do we have subjective experience (Chalmers, 2003), or why, in Nagel’s famous phrase, 
there is something it is like to be in a conscious state (Nagel, 1974, pp. 435-450).  
People who resist the view that there is a genuine distinction to be drawn here have at least two kinds of 
answer. First, following the late Wittgenstein (1958) they can argue that the ‘unbridgeable gulf between 
consciousness and brain-process’ is only an illusion: the mystery of subjective experience is the outcome of our 
own mystification; for we are those who project certain misunderstandings of the conceptual or grammatical 
articulations of our language onto reality, and consequently we find that reality mysterious and unintelligible. 
Second, they feel that what prima facie looks like an intractable problem within the received computationalist 
paradigm will eventually find a solution; and that solution will come along the same lines that other distinctive 
dimensions of the mental, such as rationality and intentionality, did come along. After all, when the project of 
‘naturalizing the mind’, which roughly means the attempt to show how mental phenomena can be explained or 
explained away in physical, non-mental terms, seems so promising why not be optimistic about the prospects of 
explaining the subjectivity of the phenomenal consciousness using the same pattern of explanation that is used so 
successfully when rationality and intentionality are at stake? 
The hope here is that structures and functions of the brain will provide an appropriate causal explanation for 
consciousness in the same way that they actually did that for rationality and intentionality. To be more specific, in 
the case of the easy problems what one looks for is an explanandum for certain behavioral and cognitive 
functions. The required explanation proceeds via the causal role that a certain structure or mechanism plays in the 
cognitive system, and there is compelling evidence that computational mechanisms instantiated by neural 
structures fit the overall causal nexus within which brain and mind are integrated. So, what makes materialism a 
very attractive position in current metaphysics of mind is precisely this causal story that materialism tells us about 
how intelligent human behavior is produced by physical structures through their causal roles that they play within 
our cognitive economy. 
But now, is there any compelling evidence that the same explanatory materialist strategy will do with respect 
to the properties of phenomenal consciousness? Against the background provided by the current science of the 
mind is it reasonable after all to embrace the optimistic view that the same materialist causal explanation will 
provide eventually the resources needed to place consciousness within the physical order of things? 
Here it is a diagnosis of the current state in philosophy of mind, offered by an important American 
epistemologist, viz. BonJour (2010, p.4): “Recent philosophy of mind has been dominated by materialist (or 
physicalist) views: views that hold that mental states are entirely material or physical in nature, and correlatively 
that a complete account of the world, one that leaves nothing out, can be given in entirely materialist terms. 
Though  …  this  may  be  changing  to  some  extent,  philosophers  of  mind  who  are  willing  to  take  seriously  the  
possibility that materialism might be false are still quite rare.”   
We can hear lately dissenting voices when this issue is at stake. For the advocates of dualist solutions to the 
problem of phenomenal consciousness will answer in the negative to the question raised before. The rationale is 
that explaining intelligent behavior and cognitive functions will not do in general as a solution to the issue of why 
when we perform a cognitive function we subjectively experience certain qualitative states which have a 
phenomenal character, with phenomenal properties also known as qualia that characterize what it is like to be in 
that state. Why, after all, the performance of those functions is accompanied by a subjective experience and does 
not take place, as it were, blindly, or in the dark? 
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Here it is again BonJour (2010, p.4): “I have always found the situation extremely puzzling. As far as I can 
see, materialism is a view that has no very compelling argument in its favor and that is confronted with very 
powerful objections to which nothing even approaching an adequate response has been offered. The central 
objection, elaborated in various ways …, is that the main materialist view, quite possibly the only serious 
materialist view, offers no account at all of consciousness and seems incapable in principle of doing so. But 
consciousness, as Nagel pointed out long ago, is the central feature of mental states – or at the very least a feature 
central enough to make a view that cannot account for it plainly inadequate.”  
But even writers who are not self-avowed dualists acknowledge the peculiarity of consciousness. Thus, Levine 
(2001, p.6), who in his Purple Haze. The Puzzle of Consciousness articulates and defends a reductionist 
materialist story about mind, nevertheless emphatically says that ‘if mentality were exhausted by rationality and 
intentionality, I don’t think the mind-body problem would be so pressing. Sure, we don’t completely understand 
how either rational inference or intentionality arises in nature, and it may turn out that we never will. But at the 
moment there is no reason for deep-seated pessimism. The explanatory mechanisms we have available – formal 
processes with nomic/informational relations – might do the job. We have at least a clue how something made out 
of  what  we’re  made  out  of  could  possibly  support  these  features  of  mental  life.  But  when  it  comes  to  
consciousness, I maintain, we are clueless.’  
The issue of dualism has been brought to the forefront of the consciousness studies lately because of a group of 
three epistemic arguments which are directed against the materialist explanation of consciousness (David 
Chalmers, 2003). More specifically, there is the so-called explanation argument, the conceivability (or the modal) 
argument, and the knowledge argument. Since in the remaining part of my paper I’ll focus on certain moot points 
of the conceivability argument, let me give you in rough outline the other two arguments. 
The explanatory argument goes like this. Since physical accounts explain at most spatio-temporal structures 
and functions or causal roles in the production of a system’s behavior, and since explaining structure and function 
does not suffice to explain phenomenal consciousness, it follows that no physical account can explain 
consciousness. 
The upshot of the knowledge argument is that knowledge of physical facts does not entail knowledge about 
consciousness. The argument has got a vivid and famous illustration in a thought experiment conceived by Frank 
Jackson (1986).  The story goes like this: Mary is a neuroscientist who knows everything there is to know about 
the physical processes which are involved in color vision. However, Mary lived her entire life in a black-and-
white room and consequently she never experienced red. It appears then that there are truths about experiencing 
color vision that Mary does not know: she does not know what it is like to see red. What is important to 
emphasize is that even if we presuppose that she has complete physical knowledge and perfect powers of 
reasoning she  is  not  able  to  perform the  deduction  of  what  it  is  like  to  see  red  from her  complete  repertoire  of  
physical knowledge. Of course, later, if her color vision is not impaired and she experiences red she will learn 
something new of which she had been ignorant so far. That something Mary learns is precisely what it is like to 
see red. 
In a general, more abstract form Mary’s case motivates the following argument: since there are truths about 
consciousness that are not deducible from physical truths, and since materialism is false, if there are truths about 
consciousness that are not deducible from physical truths, it follows that materialism is false. 
The last argument in this group of three epistemic arguments is the conceivability argument. A simple version 
of the argument will look as follows (David Chalmers, 2003):   
Consciousness is non-physical, because it is at least conceivable that there be zombies, and if it is conceivable 
that there be zombies, then it is metaphysically possible that there be zombies, and if it is metaphysically possible 
that there be zombies, then consciousness is non-physical. 
A more abstract form will make explicit the anti-materialist substance of the conceivability argument. 
Incidentally, this shows that a common thread of all views in the metaphysics of mind which have a materialist 
commitment, such as identity theory, logical behaviorism, functionalism or eliminative materialism, is the modal 
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thesis: Necessarily (physical truths entail phenomenological truths).  Let  then  P  be  the  conjunction  of  all  
microphysical truths and Q a phenomenal truth whatsoever about the world. The more general conceivability 
argument will proceed thus: 
Being conceivable that P & ~Q entails being metaphysically possible that P & ~Q, and being metaphysically 
possible that P & ~Q entails materialism being false, and since it is conceivable that P & ~Q it follows that 
materialism is false. 
The first step of the argument is a conceivability statement: it is at least conceivable that there be a zombie, 
which is a system physically identical to a conscious being, which nevertheless does not experience at least some 
of that being’s conscious states. To be sure, chances that there are zombies in the actual world are almost nil. And 
we can say even more: the way things are physically rule out the physical possibility of there existing zombies or 
a zombie world, which is a universe physically identical to ours which, nevertheless, lacks consciousness. 
However, it seems that our power of imagining things can produce a coherent picture of such a universe. On 
reflection there is no contradiction in the idea of imagining zombies. 
Then the second step in the argument is a daring one from a modal logic point of view. In a few words this 
premise can be dubbed the conceivability-entails-the-possibility thesis. It connects logically the conceivability of 
zombies to the metaphysical possibility of zombies. 
What is the import of all this to the theme of dualism? Well, if a zombie world could have existed then 
consciousness is not necessitated by the physical arrangements of things, and hence consciousness must be 
something non-physical. For if a metaphysically possible world, which is a perfect replica of the physical 
arrangement of our actual world, lacks any trace of conscious experience of systems over there, then 
consciousness must be a non-physical ingredient of our actual world. 
Now, all those three arguments are neo-Cartesian arguments whose general pattern is the following: 
There is an epistemic gap between the physical truths and the phenomenal truths, and since there being an 
epistemic gap between the physical truths and the phenomenal truths entails there being an ontological gap 
between the two domains, and since furthermore there being an ontological gap between the two domains entails 
that materialism is false, it follows that materialism is false. 
This common pattern of neo-Cartesian arguments nicely brings out the dialectics which is going on here. For 
the reactions of materialists against this form of dualism can be read off from this pattern. Thus, one form of 
materialism, viz. ‘type-A materialism’, rejects premise one, whereas another type, viz. type-B materialism, which 
is of interest for my paper here, endorses premise one and denies premise two. But either way dualism is blocked. 
Type-B materialism is instructive for our discussion here because it collides head on with the form of dualism 
advocated by the conceivability argument. What this form of materialism rejects is that epistemic failure entails 
ontological failure. According to this form of materialism, there is indeed an epistemic gap between the physical 
and the phenomenal domains, but that gap is not underwritten by a corresponding ontological gap; hence 
conceivability does not entail possibility. In other words, even if the two realms do not connect via conceiving or 
knowing or explaining, it doesn’t follow that there is no ontological connections between the two domains. 
Hence, even if a zombie world is conceivable, it is not, however, metaphysically possible. 
Going back to our three arguments what all this means is that we can conceive zombies but that is not 
sufficient for them to be metaphysically possible; or Mary does not know some truths while she is in her room, 
but those truths concern all along some basic physical facts (and when Mary gets out of her room she comes to 
know the same facts under different guises). Type-B materialism even acknowledges the distinction between the 
easy problems and the hard problem of consciousness. However, there is no ontological gap underlying the 
epistemic gap between the two domains. 
What is now the kind of relation which holds between matter and mind according to this type of materialism? 
Most forms of type-B materialism spell out the relation in terms of identity between phenomenal states and 
physical states or functional states. There is a powerful kind of argument which can be used to back the identity 
relation involved in this construal of type-B materialism, and what I mean by this are statements used to express 
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theoretical identifications of the kind ‘Water is H2O’ or ‘Gold is the element with atomic number 79’. Kripke 
(1971) and Putnam (1975) have argued that these are cases of identities which are not known a priori or derived 
through conceptual analysis, and so they are empirical identities, but they are nevertheless metaphysically 
necessary. Type-B materialists hold that identities of the same kind obtain between phenomenal concepts and 
physical or functional concepts. However, this is kind of ironical, for Kripke himself explicitly rejects this view. 
I’ll come back to this in a moment. So, type-B materialists will say that what Kripke holds about theoretic 
identifications, like water is H2O, applies equally well to the relation between consciousness or phenomenal 
concepts on the one hand, and physical or functional concepts, on the other hand, which is that we may discover 
empirically that the two distinct concepts refer to the same thing in nature. Those truths are a posteriori and 
necessary. 
This is a superb move which is meant to conciliate the epistemic gap between the two domains (for since we 
discover empirically that phenomenal and physical concepts co-refer there is nothing within the repertoire of our 
knowledge which entitles us to infer a priori possibility from conceivability) while ruling out the ontological gap 
(deep down the thing to which both concepts refer is the same physical thing). And of course, this move aims at 
accommodating the common intuition people have, which is that the subjectivity of the mental does not fit well 
within an objective description of things, with the materialist view that ultimately everything there is out there is 
physical in its nature. 
It  is  quite  natural  then  for  a  type-B  materialist  to  try  to  make  use  of  Kripke’s  work  on  the  necessary  a  
posteriori truths. For since those truths are metaphysically necessary but not knowable a priori, a type-B 
materialist will find a natural option to qualify the conditional ‘Physical truths hold only if Qualia hold’ as being 
a necessary a posteriori truth, which parallels the necessary a posteriori truth ‘Water is H2O’. The epistemic gap 
is there, for there is no a priori entailment from Physical truths to Qualia, but the counterpart ontological gap is 
absent. Type-B materialism is vindicated by Kripke’s work. (Sic!) 
But  be  that  as  it  may.  Well,  it’s  ironical,  to  begin  with.  For  Kripke  shows  that  the  identity  between  
phenomenal concepts and physical concepts is not of the same kind as the identity expressed by the sentence 
‘Water is H2O’. So, the issue now is what makes consciousness an exceptional case to which a conceivability 
type of argument does apply? And when I say ‘exceptional case’ I really mean it, for it appears that it is only in 
the domain of consciousness that conceivability can be a reliable guide to possibility. 
Toward the end of his classic Naming and Necessity, and also in his paper ‘Identity and Necessity’ Kripke 
observes that materialists have argued for some or even for all of the following statements: 
Persons are (identical with their) bodies. 
Sensations are (identical with) neural events. 
Types of sensations are (identical with) types of neural events. 
and he devises a type of neo-Cartesian argument against each of those claims. Kripke stops short of endorsing 
the arguments. However, he clearly says that the arguments are valid and suggests that the premises are 
intuitively plausible. In addition to that, the modal considerations the arguments are built on are powerful and 
efficient not just against the above mentioned identifications, but also against materialism as such. 
In the passages related to our issue, Kripke motivates two different modal arguments against the identification 
of a person with his/her body; likewise for the identification of sensations (or type of sensations) with neural 
events  (or  types  of  neural  events).  If  we  focus  upon  the  rejection  of  the  first  kind  of  identification  then  the  
structure of argumentation is twofold. There is an argument based on the Cartesian concept of a disembodied 
mind, which goes like this: Kripke might have existed without his body; therefore Kripke  Kripke’s body. And 
there is another kind of argument which is similar to the arguments involving zombies. Here it is: Kripke’s body 
might have existed without Kripke; hence Kripke  Kripke’s body. 
Kripke  himself  is  crystal  clear  about  the  validity  of  those  two  arguments.  He  says:  ‘Now  the  one  response  
which I regard as plainly inadmissible is the response which cheerfully accepts the Cartesian premise, while 
denying the Cartesian conclusion.’ (Kripke, 1972; 1980, pp. 334-335) How is that working? Let ‘Kripke’ be a 
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name, or rigid designator, of a person, and let ‘B’ be a rigid designator of his body. Then, according to Kripke’s 
modal metaphysics and semantics, if Kripke were identical to B, then the supposed identity, being an identity 
expressed by a sentence in which two rigid designators occur, would be necessary, and Kripke could not exist 
without B and B could not exist without Kripke. And Kripke himself rightly says: ‘A philosopher who wishes to 
refute the Cartesian conclusion must refute the Cartesian premise, and the latter task is not trivial.’ (Kripke, 1972; 
1980, pp. 334-335). 
In another passage we find: ‘All arguments against the identity theory which rely on the necessity of identity, 
or on the notion of essential property, are, of course, inspired by Descartes’ argument for his dualism … The 
simplest Cartesian argument can perhaps be restated as follows: let “A” be a name (rigid designator) of 
Descartes’ body. Then Descartes argues that since he could exist, even if A did not, ~(Descartes = A), hence 
~(Descartes = A). Those who have accused him of a modal fallacy have forgotten that “A” is rigid. His argument 
is valid, and his conclusion is correct, provided its (perhaps dubitable) premise is accepted. (Kripke, 1971, n. 19). 
 But why would somebody think that the argument is invalid? One reason could be that people might 
construe the form of the argument along the following lines (where t  is non-rigid): it is possible that (t exists 
without t ); therefore t  t . And this makes sense. For if there is some possible world with respect to which (the 
non-rigid designator) t  designates something that t exists without at that world (so that the premise is true), it 
could still be the case that t and t  designate the same thing in the actual world (and thus the conclusion is false). 
Kripke’s own interpretation of the Cartesian argument insists on taking both t and t  as rigid designators. Then 
the modal argument is in very good modal standing: since (t exists without t ), and (t  t ), it follows that t  t . 
Now, the neo-Cartesian argument got its modal honorability, provided the diamond is read as metaphysically 
possible. But to this, one might still reply that the move begs the question in favor of answering in the affirmative 
to the main issue I am dealing with here, which is whether conceivability entails possibility. For remember that 
the starting point of a Cartesian argument consists in conceiving something to be the case. So, it’s time to go back 
again to the main issue before I finish. 
 It seems that what we need is a sort of direct argument for the idea that conceivability entails possibility. 
And this could go as follows. What we want to argue for is the thesis that Conceivable (P & ~Q) entails Possible 
(P & ~Q). 
The suggestion should not be that zombies are physically possible relative to the actual world. Rather, since 
we can coherently conceive a zombie world then even if such a world is ruled out as a physical possibility by the 
physical laws that obtain at the actual world it is nevertheless metaphysically possibly possible relative to the 
actual world, in the sense that if the things were different from a physical point of view and a different set of 
physical laws had obtained then that different set of physical laws would have not metaphysically necessitated a 
physical system which has conscious states. So, it may very well be the case that a zombie world is inaccessible 
in  one  step  from the  actual  world  but  via the coherence of conceiving a zombie world it is accessible from the 
actual world in two steps, which means that it could have existed. But then, if the accessibility relation between 
worlds is transitive then in a very precise model theoretic sense we’ve got the following reduction principle: if a 
zombie world is metaphysically possibly possible then it is just possible. A pair of possibilities collapses to one 
possibility: for whatever is possibly possible is just possible or to phrase this in an alternative way, something is 
possible precisely when it is possibly possible. And since entailment itself is transitive, it follows that if a zombie 
world is conceivable in the actual world then it is possible relative to the actual world. 
Now, I know quite well that most people usually react drastically to this kind of arguments involving fictional 
objects and very abstract notions and principles. It is very legitimate then to ask ourselves what the relevance of 
this kind of analysis would be to so great a problem. How much is it worth this arm-chair philosophizing about 
consciousness? In this respect, it is very instructive to take a look at the attitude of an experimentalist towards 
this way of tackling the issue. Harris (1995), for instance, in his paper called ‘An experimentalist looks at 
identity’ says: ‘Experimentalists who consider themselves to be working on the mind or on the brain find this 
argument laughable; but this is not due to any error in the formalism. So long as Kripke stays within his formal 
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system, the substitution of properties that he makes is unimpeachable. But when he substitutes elements of the 
real world (minds and brains) for x and y, the argument breaks down completely. … What we have here is simply 
an example of an incompatibility with which every experimentalist is intimately familiar: the failure of a formal 
model to accommodate the complexity of reality. In formal systems identity means no more than substitutivity 
within the system; but in the world of sticks and stones additional or other criteria apply. However, what disturbs 
the experimental scientist more deeply than the inapplicability of Kripke’s logic to the real world is the illusion 
that a question as complex and as intractable as the relationship between mind and brain could be disposed of by 
an exercise in formal logic (Harris, 1995).’ 
Well, what can be said in defense of this line of argument is that dualists can make the same general points 
using epistemological arguments, and what is even more interesting for my own project, which is, again, that of 
figuring out what functions modal notions serve within the arguments coined in philosophy of mind and 
consciousness, using the framework of the two-dimensional semantics. But I have to leave it to this for the 
moment. 
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